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(Lord Neuberger (President), Lady Hale (Deputy President), Lord Hughes, Lord 
Toulson, Lord Thomas) 
 
2016 has been a good year for the criminal law in the Supreme Court. In Taylor1 and 
now Jogee; Ruddock the Supreme Court has made genuine and relevant fault on the 
part of the defendant central to the question of his/her guilt. 
 
In Jogee the Supreme Court tackled what has been commonly, and imprecisely, 
termed “joint enterprise”2 (the Court was also sitting as the Privy Council to deal with 
the appeal of Ruddock from Jamaica on the same topic).  “Joint enterprise” has passed 
into common usage and as such is a term much used but little understood. At its 
broadest it denotes the principle by which two or more defendants are all guilty of an 
offence despite not all taking part in the offence in the same way: 
 
1) D1 and D2 each, with the requisite fault element of the offence, perform at 
least part of the conduct aspect of the offence, making them joint principals. 
2) D2 assists, encourages or procures D1 to commit offence X/a particular type 
of offence, making D2 secondarily liable for the offence committed by D1 – 
this is basic accessorial liability (BAL). 
3) D1 and D2 set off intending to commit an offence together making them 
sometimes joint principals and sometimes principal and secondary parties 
respectively – this is common purpose liability (CPL) 
4) D1 and D2 are jointly involved in, or at least set off to commit, offence A, 
during the course of which D1 commits offence B. D2 is guilty of offence B if 
s/he foresaw the possibility that D1 might3 commit crime B and continued to 
participate in crime A – this is “parasitic accessorial liability”4 (PAL),  
 
PAL was the variant of joint enterprise which was before the Court and its scope was 
broad indeed. Nothing beyond D2’s involvement in crime A was required for D2 to 
be guilty of crime B, save that D2 contemplated the possibility that D1 might do it, or 
something like it.5 D2 could go from being guilty of affray to being guilty of murder 
simply through foresight that D1 might do something to cause someone’s death with 
the intention to at least cause grievous bodily harm. D1, however, must actually wield 
the knife and strike the fatal blow whilst intending to kill or cause grievous bodily 
harm. The differences in both conduct and culpability which led to guilty verdicts for 
D1 and D2 were stark and criticism of the doctrine has grown in recent years.6  
 
Parasitic accessorial liability is dead, long live secondary liability 
 
In Jogee the Supreme Court killed off PAL, stating that all secondary liability is 
governed by the same principles:  
 
1) D2 must assist or encourage D1 in the commission of offence X; 
2) D2 must know any necessary facts which gives D1’s conduct or intended 
conduct its criminal character; 7  and  
3) with that knowledge, D2 must intend to assist or encourage D1 to commit 
offence X, with the requisite mental fault element for that offence.8   
 
D2 is equally liable if it is a type of offence, rather than a specific offence, which s/he 
assists or encourages D1 to commit. 9  
 
The principles can adapt to differing circumstances, so that if there is an agreement 
between D1 and D2 it might be express or tacit 10 and arise in spontaneous group 
violence as easily as in planned criminal activity. 11 It may be that offence X is one 
which may or may not happen in the course of a planned activity. For example, D1 
and D2 commit an armed bank robbery together during which D1 shoots and kills a 
security guard, intending to at least cause him grievous bodily harm (offence X here 
being the murder of the security guard). D2 is secondarily liable for the murder if s/he 
intended that if anyone did cause them trouble during the robbery, the weapons they 
carried should be used to with the intent to at least do grievous bodily harm. That 
intent can perfectly well co-exist with a desire to commit the robbery without having 
to use the weapons. The Court termed this “conditional intent” and emphasised that 
intention is not synonymous with desire.12  
 
If D1 goes beyond what D1 knew and intended to assist, that does not necessarily 
mean that D2 escapes conviction, as a lesser offence might still have been committed. 
In the paradigm case of murder this will usually mean D2 is guilty of manslaughter, 
specifically unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. 13 
 D2’s foresight of what D1 might do is relegated to its proper place as evidence from 
which D2’s knowledge and intention might be inferred by the jury. 14 Mental fault is 
no longer sufficient alone or a guilty verdict as D2 needs to act to assist or encourage 
D1 with the requisite knowledge and intent. 
 
This return to the foundational principles of secondary liability was the solution urged 
upon the Court by Jogee and supported by Ruddock.15 Although the principles now 
restated by the Court appear uncontroversial, and when one reads the judgment in 
Jogee it all seems rather clear and straightforward, it should be remembered that since 
the Privy Council’s statement of the principles of PAL in Chan Wing-Siu16 in 1984, 
there has been precious little judicial derogation from it, despite opportunities at all 
levels including the House of Lords and Supreme Court.17 Instead, BAL was 
overtaken by PAL such that the principles of PAL, in which foresight blurred into 
intention, led to a watering down of the requirements for secondary liability.18 It 
should be noted that the fault is not to be laid solely at the door of the judiciary; the 
great Professor J.C. Smith was in favour of PAL.19  
 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the route to PAL 
 
The Supreme Court puts the start of PAL down to the decision of the Privy Council in 
Chan Wing-Siu20 where Sir Robin Cook stated that: 21  
 
Th[is] case must depend rather on the wider principle whereby a secondary 
party is criminally liable for acts by the primary offender of a type which the 
former foresees but does not necessarily intend. 
 
That there is such a principle is not in doubt. It turns on contemplation or, 
putting the same idea in other words, authorisation, which may be express but 
is more usually implied. It meets the case of a crime foreseen as a possible 
incident of the common unlawful enterprise. The criminal culpability lies in 
participating in the venture with that foresight. 
 
To determine how Sir Robin came to make this pronouncement, conflating 
contemplation with authorisation and leaving D2 guilty for the actions of D1 which 
s/he might only have foreseen as a vague possibility and done nothing to intentionally 
bring about, the Court set out to examine the history of secondary liability. The 
judgment traces BAL back to into the 17th and 18th centuries and follows its 
development up to Chan Wing-Siu and beyond,22 leading to the distillation of the 
principles of secondary liability given above.  
 
Secondary liability is a common law doctrine (albeit one that was made statutory in 
the Accessories and Abbettors Act 1861 s.823) by which D2 is liable for an offence 
actually committed by D1. Traditionally the terminology was that D2 “aid, abet, 
counsel or procure”, modernised by the Law Commission into assist or encourage.24 
The Law Commission also mentions procuring, but the Supreme Court disregards that 
mode of participation. There is, however, no reason why the same principles of 
secondary liability could not apply to procuring. 
 The essence of secondary liability 
 
The Court correctly identifies that it has never been a requirement that D2 caused 
D1’s conduct, but there has always had to be sufficient connection between D1’s 
offence and D2’s conduct for D2 to be secondarily liable.25 Lord Toulson had 
previously argued that a “broad theory of causation”, beyond mere “but for” 
causation, was a proper explanation of secondary liability26 and some of the Supreme 
Court in Gnango appeared to be attracted to this idea.27 For Jogee it was argued 
before the Court that the proper justification for D2’s criminal liability for D1’s 
offence is not causation but a sufficient connection to the offence, together with 
sufficient mental culpability; in essence intentional participation in D1’s criminal 
activity in the knowledge of what that criminal activity is. These submissions were 
accepted by the Court,28 albeit that the Court only expressly refers to assistance and 
encouragement as modes of participation.  
 
The Court notes that D2 must intend to assist D1 to act with the mental element 
necessary for the offence, but in passing accepts that D2 and D1 need not have a 
common or shared intent that the final offence be committed, as in the situation where 
D2 supplies arms to D1 but is indifferent to whether D1 actually goes on to use 
them.29 It is unfortunate that this is the only point in the judgment which refers to the 
fact that D1 and D2 might not share a common intention as more detailed analysis of 
this would have assisted in understanding the development of PAL, which, it is 
submitted, grew out of CPL rather than normal BAL cases. It is also important to 
understand that not all secondary liability cases involve agreement between D1 and 
D2, tacit or express; that is only one strand of secondary liability. Examination of 
CPL will therefore assist in understanding the different modes of secondary 
participation. 
 
Common purpose liability 
 
It is a mistake to see CPL as simply a branch of BAL as the CPL cases do not 
necessary involve secondary liability. Historically the cases commonly involve riot30 
or poaching,31 which could involve D1 and D2 as joint principals, or as principal and 
secondary participants. Reported cases tend to deal with what happened when, for 
instance, a constable or gamekeeper was killed by D1 during the poaching or rioting: 
both D1 and D2 were guilty for the killing of a constable or gamekeeper by D1 if they 
shared an intention “to resist all opposers”32 or similar: as Alderson B put it in 
Macklin, 
 
it is a principle of law, that if several persons act together in pursuance of a 
common intent, every act done in furtherance of such intent by each of them 
is, in law, done by all. The act, however, must be in pursuance of the common 
intent.33  
 
Thus the secondary liability arose out of the primary liability and the intention in 
relation to that. As a result, there grew the idea that further evidence of aiding or 
abetting was not required, as noted by Toulson LJ (as he then was) in Mendez and 
Thompson:  
 
Although some distinguished scholars consider that joint enterprise liability 
[PAL] differs doctrinally from ordinary principles of secondary criminal 
liability, we incline to the view that joint venture liability is an aspect of them, 
as it is put in Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law; 12th ed (2008), 207: “The 
only peculiarity of joint enterprise cases is that, once a common purpose to 
commit the offence in question is proved, there is no need to look for further 
evidence of assisting and encouraging. The act of combining to commit the 
offence satisfies these requirements of aiding and abetting. Frequently it will 
be acts of encouragement which provide the evidence of the common purpose. 
It is simply necessary to apply the ordinary principles of secondary liability to 
the joint enterprise.34  
 
This is a misunderstanding of CPL which is what PAL really was; there does need to 
be further evidence of assisting and encouraging if D1 is going beyond the original 
common purpose. To be liable under CPL the scope of the common purpose must first 
be determined. If D1 goes beyond the common purpose, D2 is not, without more, 
responsible for D1’s offending. Determining the scope of the common purpose is thus 
crucial, but not always easy to do evidentially. 
 
The Supreme Court relies upon Foster to say that the scope of the common intention 
was determined objectively in the 18th century.35 There is much support for this 
argument. It had been a rule of law into the nineteenth century that D was taken to 
intend the natural and probable consequences of his actions,36 softened to a rebuttable 
presumption of evidence by the mid-twentieth century,37 the principle only finally 
excised from the law by s.8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1968. However, the Court’s 
failure to consider CPL and BAL separately causes problems here as Foster is not 
discussing CPL but instead D2 counselling D1 to offend. In the CPL cases there is no 
objective assessment of natural and probable consequences of D1 or D2’s actions, just 
an assessment of what their common purpose was by looking at what they had 
agreed.38 The 1913 case of Pridmore39 shows the approach. While Pridmore and 
Ironmonger were out poaching in Titchmarsh Wood on a December night, they were 
surprised by gamekeepers. One of the defendants shot and wounded one of the 
gamekeepers. Both were charged with attempted murder. The jury could not 
determine who fired the shot but found both men guilty as they were agreed that the 
intention was “to prevent arrest at all costs, even to the extent of murder”. On 
Pridmore’s appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal pointed to all the circumstantial 
evidence which supported the jury’s conclusion and approved the judge’s direction to 
the jury which focused not on what the probable results of being confronted by a 
gamekeeper would be but whether “both [defendants] must have realised that 
resistance at all costs was likely to happen”.  
 
If the actions of D1 went beyond the purpose which was common with D2, D2 was 
not, without more, criminally responsible. As Alderson B continued in Macklin  
 
Thus, if several were to intend and agree together to frighten a constable, and 
one were to short him through the head, such an act would affect the 
individual only by whom it was done.  
 
Of course the common purpose might change and it would be necessary to look at the 
evidence to determine what D2 had agreed to, even if only tacitly. It is when dealing 
with this aspect of CPL, determining the final extent of D1 and D2’s common 
purpose, that the cases used language which was later to form the basis of PAL, but 
that language was taken out of context, leading to a misreading of these cases. In 
Davies the House of Lords discussed what evidence there was upon which a jury 
could conclude that a witness was an accomplice and stated:  
 
I can see no reason why, if half a dozen boys fight another crowd, and one of 
them produces a knife and stabs one of the opponents to death, all the rest of 
his group should be treated as accomplices in the use of a knife and the 
infliction of mortal injury by that means, unless there is evidence that the rest 
intended or concerted or at least contemplated an attack with a knife by one of 
their number, as opposed to a common assault.40 (emphasis added) 
 
In Smith (Wesley) when discussing a conviction for manslaughter, not murder, (prior 
to Church41 laying down the principles of unlawful act manslaughter) 
 
It must have been clearly within the contemplation of a man like Smith who, 
to use one expression, had almost gone berserk himself to have left the public-
house only to get bricks to tear up the joint, that if the bar tender did his duty 
to quell the disturbance and picked up the night stick, anyone whom he knew 
had a knife in his possession, like Atkinson, might use it on the barman, as 
Atkinson did. By no stretch of imagination, in the opinion of this court, can 
that be said to be outside the scope of the concerted action in this case.42 
(emphasis added) 
 
In Betty the trial judge explained how far removed D1’s actions were from the 
common purpose:  
 
if two men attack a third without any intention of killing in the mind of either 
of them, and, as the fight develops, one or other conceives in his mind an 
intention to kill and does kill, of course, that does not make the other man 
guilty of murder, because he never contemplated that was going to be done, he 
did not intend it, and, in fact, did not do the act of killing. 43 (emphasis added) 
 
In Anderson and Morris Lord Parker stated 
 
It seems to this court that to say that adventurers are guilty of manslaughter 
when one of them has departed completely from the concerted action of the 
common design and has suddenly formed an intent to kill and has used a 
weapon and acted in a way which no party to that common design could 
suspect is something which would revolt the conscience of people today.44 
(emphasis added) 
 
Davies,  Anderson and Morris (which considered Betty and Smith) and Smith were 
referred to in argument in Chan Wing-Siu and all had in fact involved an evidential 
consideration of what was within the common purpose, but all of them could be used, 
shorn of that context, to argue that contemplation of a circumstance was enough to 
bring that consequence within the common purpose. The Australian cases relied upon 
by the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu (Johns45 and Miller46) had gone further than 
the English cases and arguably already begun to create PAL by stating that 
contemplation of an event makes D2 secondarily liable for it. It is significantly easier 
to see how Sir Robin reached his conclusions when seen in this context. 
 
Once PAL took firm hold in Chan Wing-Siu it was extended beyond its CPL roots to 
bring BAL down to its level in cases such as Rook47 and Reardon.48  
 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of PAL 
 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the development of PAL touches on Betty and 
Anderson and Morris, not to explain CPL, but to establish (1) that where D1’s actions 
are “an overwhelming supervening event” no liability for murder attaches to D2 but 
(2) that D2 may still be liable for manslaughter in that circumstance.49  
 
The first of the Court’s points is accurate and explains how, as PAL developed and its 
scope became clear, D2’s lack of knowledge of D1’s weapon was elevated to a 
defence of fundamental difference, as in English50 where D1 and D2 attacked V with 
wooden posts, then D1 pulled out a knife and stabbed V to death, D2’s conviction for 
V’s murder was quashed as the knife was more dangerous than the wooden posts. 
Now that PAL has gone, the focus on the specific weapon used or precisely how 
dangerous it was, can be put in its proper place, which is part of the evidence for the 
jury to consider in determining what they are sure D2 knew and intended to assist or 
encourage.51 
 
The second point is more complicated. All the parties in Jogee agreed that 
manslaughter would be an available alternative if D2 were acquitted of the murder 
carried out by D1 and the Court firmly concludes that manslaughter is an option 
available to the jury in such cases.52 However, the authorities were not in agreement 
about this, in particular the House of Lords in Powell; English was firmly against it53 
and Professor J.C. Smith certainly did not favour this option.54 However, it is 
submitted that the Court is surely right, relying on the cases of Church55 and 
Newbury56 for the concept of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter as an 
alternative to murder. In relation to offending short of murder, if D2 has committed a 
lesser offence, then the fact that s/he is not guilty of D1’s more serious offence does 
not absolve him/her of liability for the lesser offence. This is still true if D2 is a 
secondary party to offence X (by counselling it, for instance) but the person 
counselled (D1) goes on to commit more serious offence Y.57 
 
The Court noted that there were serious problems with the basis of Chan Wing-Siu: its 
reliance on previous cases was misconceived and mistaken, taking arguments out of 
context and ignoring the factual backdrops of the cases it relied upon. The elision of 
contemplation and authorisation was simply wrong.58 (Although when CPL is 
considered the decision and its reasoning can at least be understood, if not condoned.) 
Having established that lesser alternatives would be available for D2, the public 
policy arguments fall away, finally killed off by the need for “fair labelling of 
offending and fair discrimination in sentencing”.59 The Court bore in mind that PAL 
after over 30 years was not working satisfactorily and had in fact become 
controversial causing continual problems at trial and appellate levels. Beyond the 
practical problems, the Court accepted that foresight is too low a level of mental fault, 
particularly when D1 generally must have a significantly higher level of fault, and 
should only be used as evidence from a jury could infer D2’s intention to assist what 
s/he had foreseen. This is particularly stark in murder.60 
 
The Court notes that the academic problems with the principle were noted from soon 
after the decision in Chan Wing-Siu  (by Lord Lane in the Court of Appeal in 
Wakely61, by Prof. Smith in his commentary thereon and by Lords Steyn, Hutton and 
Mustill in Powell; English). Unfortunately, these concerns were not enough to divert 
the law from its PAL course. The Supreme Court stated that it had had the “benefit of 
a far deeper and more extensive review of the topic of so-called “joint enterprise” 
liability on past occasions”62 covering both the history and the impact of PAL, but 
that is not enough, it is submitted, to explain why PAL lasted so long.   
 
Why did Prof. Smith welcome PAL? 
 
Prof. Smith saw PAL as bringing a welcome subjective approach to the area of 
criminal liability 
 
Far from extending the law as stated by Foster and his successors, the Privy 
Council [in Chan Wing-Siu] were narrowing it by substituting a subjective for 
an objective test.63 
 
In that he was echoing what Sir Robin himself declared in Chan Wing-Siu.64 The 
decision in Chan Wing-Siu was not, however, novel thought Prof. Smith: 
 
It would be quite wrong to suppose that parasitic accessory liability--liability 
for a crime not intentionally assisted or encouraged by A but merely foreseen 
by him--is a recent development in the law, an innovation by the Privy 
Council in Chan Wing-Siu. The rule imposing liability for offences committed 
in the course of committing the offence assisted or encouraged seems to be 
almost as old as the law of aiding and abetting itself.65 
 
It was Prof. Smith’s criticism of Lord Lane’s sensible judgment in Wakely (which 
focused on the need for the jury to find that D1’s actions were within the agreement 
between D1 and D2, express or tacit, rather than merely foreseen by D2) which led to 
Lord Lane changing tack in Hyde66 and following Chan Wing-Siu more closely, 
despite the fact that Chan Wing-Siu was a Privy Council rather than a House of Lords 
decision. 
 
Unfortunately, it is submitted, Prof. Smith was wrong. PAL was a pernicious theory 
which was not of ancient pedigree, but rather was an erroneous tangent. Had there 
previously been an objective assessment of the scope of the common purpose, Prof. 
Smith and Sir Robin would have been right that Chan Wing-Siu narrowed liability, 
but there had not, as discussed above. The fact is that Prof. Smith appeared to be 
entirely in favour of PAL for policy reasons. Analysed very well by Andrew Simester 
this boils down to D2’s position being normatively changed by the commission of 
offence A, making mere foresight sufficient for criminal liability for offence B.67 This 
does not, it is submitted, justify the PAL low level of mental fault, such that suspicion 
alone made a person guilty of murder. This was in reality no more than constructive 
liability which thankfully disappeared with the abolition of the felony murder rule, 
although at least the felony murder rule required D2 to be committing a serious 
offence rather than a minor one to make him/her guilty of D1’s murder of V,68 the 
poachers committing a misdemeanour in Titchmarsh Wood had not been caught by 
this overly harsh rule. Prof. Smith coolly conceded that  
 
It may be that the law is too harsh and, if so, it could be modified so as to 
require intention (or even purpose) on the part of the accessory that, in the 
event which has occurred, the principal should act as he did. Indeed, there is 
no decision preventing the House of Lords from taking this step. 69 
 
Unfortunately the House of Lords did not take that step and it is submitted that Prof. 
Smith’s influential support  for PAL extended its life. 
 
Was it the place of the Supreme Court and Privy Council to so radically change the 
law? 
 
The Court was firmly of the view that it was, noting that   
 
the doctrine of secondary liability is a common law doctrine… and, if it has 
been unduly widened by the courts, it is proper for the courts to correct the 
error.70 
 
It did take comfort though, from the wording of s.44 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 
which covers D encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence and requires 
from D an intention to encourage and assist, specifically noting in s.44(2) that D 
cannot be taken to have that intent just because he foresaw the encouragement or 
assistance as the consequence of his act.71  
 
This is surely correct. When the courts have created an error in the law, particularly 
one which is due to a mistake by the appellate judiciary, it is for the courts to correct 
it as soon as possible. 
 
The effect of Jogee and Ruddock 
 
Appeals from those convicted under PAL/BAL under PAL principles 
 
Jogee has successfully killed off PAL and made secondary liability both simple and 
principled. The Court accepts that it is “reversing a statement of principle”72 by so 
doing, noting that  
 
It would not be satisfactory for this court simply to disapprove the Chan Wing-
Siu principle. Those who are concerned with criminal justice, including 
members of the public, are entitled to expect from this court a clear statement 
of the relevant principles.73  
 
Although it does not at any stage use the term “declaratory theory”74 it is nonetheless 
adhering to it, for it accepts that the there is a potential impact on those convicted 
under PAL over the preceding 32 years, because the law, although “faithfully” 
applied, was “mistaken”. That is not to say that all those convicted under PAL will be 
entitled to have their cases reopened by means of an appeal out of time to the Court of 
Appeal (Criminal Division). Indeed, the Court is keen to state that, just as it and the 
Court of Appeal have stated repeatedly over the years, the fact that the law has been 
corrected does not mean that the courts will entertain out of time appeals based simply 
on the new old law.75 The principle for dealing with applications is this: 
 
The court has power to grant such leave [to appeal out of time], and may do so 
if substantial injustice be demonstrated, but it will not do so simply because 
the law applied has now been declared to be mistaken. 
 
The Court was also keen to emphasise that  
 
the same principles must govern the decision of the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission  if it is asked to consider referring a conviction to the Court of 
Appeal. 76 
 
The desire to stem the feared flood of applications is understandable when one 
considers the creaking criminal appeal system,77 although there is an immediate 
feeling of concern generated by the need for “substantial injustice” rather than mere 
common or garden injustice. On reflection, however, there is some cause for 
optimism. There is doubtless injustice in having been convicted under a law which 
was wrong and it may well be that if a case does get in front of the Court of Appeal, 
an appeal would be allowed, but that is not a foregone conclusion. When the Supreme 
Court’s predecessor last changed the criminal law in this way (to make it no longer 
possible to charge indecent assault for sexual intercourse with a child under 16 when 
the offence of unlawful sexual intercourse was time barred78), when an appeal did 
reach the Court of Appeal, it was allowed.79 That was a conviction, though, which 
was obtained by an abuse of the process of the court and the conviction was inevitably 
unsafe.80 That the PAL principles were relied upon does not mean that conviction 
would not have followed a jury direction consistent with the restated principles of 
secondary liability, thus the conviction might not be unsafe. The Supreme Court has 
attempted to close the door on appeals based on the injustice of the application of 
mistaken law (whether it succeeds will be a different matter) but it has certainly not 
closed the door on appeals where D2 would not have been convicted under the 
restated principles. There will doubtless be a lot of applications for leave to appeal out 
of time, and applications to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, but it will be 
interesting to see how many of them reach the Court of Appeal. 
 
Intent 
 
Although the case does not mention Woollin81, the firm comments it makes about 
foresight of consequences being “evidence from which a jury can infer the presence 
of a requisite intention”82 must surely bolster the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division)’s understanding of Lord Steyn’s judgment in Woollin in Matthews and 
Alleyne83, that evidence, even of a virtually certain consequence which the defendant 
foresaw is still only evidence from which a jury can find intent rather than being 
within the legal definition of intent. 
 
Outside England and Wales 
 
It is important not to forget that this was not just a domestic appeal; the Privy Council 
has also ruled and the effect on Commonwealth jurisdictions will, it is hoped, be 
great. The Court rightly notes that the Australian case of Johns84 was heavily relied 
upon in Chan Wing-Siu and the courts in Australia have been bound by the Australian 
High Court decision of McAuliffe85 which adopted Chan Wing-Siu, most recently in 
the South Australian’ Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision Spilios86. Although this 
article has criticised some of the Court’s analysis of how PAL developed and 
continued, the Court’s reasoned disposal of PAL is generally excellent and the 
conclusion is, it is submitted, extremely welcome in spirit and substance. It is hoped 
that the High Court of Australia in particular bears Jogee in mind when next it 
considers PAL (or “extended common purpose liability” as it is there referred to). 
 
In the domestic context it is submitted that the judgment in Jogee sets a high standard 
for judicial approach, thinking and writing which it is hoped the courts continue to 
strive for. 
 
In am indebted to the other counsel for Jogee (Felicity Gerry QC, Adam Wagner and 
Diarmuid Laffan) as well as Dr Matthew Dyson for the work put into preparing 
materials for the Supreme Court, many of which have been drawn upon to prepare 
this case note. 
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